

# AIRGRAM

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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A-90

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HANDLING INDICATOR

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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 APR 30 3 37 PM 1973

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EO 11652: GDS  
 TAGS: PINS, BR

RS/AN  
 ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: April 18, 1973

SUBJECT: Widespread Arrests and Psychophysical Interrogation  
 of Suspected Subversives

REF : Rio's A-80, March 21, 1973; Rio's 1310,  
 April 16, 1973

EDI 9.3 BRAZ  
 Pol 13-2 BRAZ

### SUMMARY

Arrests by First Army agents of suspected subversives have increased dramatically during the past several weeks in the Rio area. Mostly university students, the detainees are being subjected to an intensive psychophysical system of duress designed to extract information without doing visible, lasting harm to the body. Those suspected of being hardened terrorists, it is said, are still being submitted to the older methods of physical violence which sometimes cause death. The most plausible reason behind the upsurge of arrests seems to be that efficient police follow-up on information extracted from detentions made earlier this year has produced an ever-expanding number of suspected subversives to be apprehended. Another widely circulated but less logical explanation ties the arrests to the presidential succession decision. Public reaction to the arrests has been mild and subdued thus far, partly because of the belief that any open campaign to expose and criticize the arrests would only make matters worse for those being held and would likely result in other detentions.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 BUREAU OF  
 INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

### I. Arrests Increase Dramatically

MAY 3 - 1973

During the past several weeks, arrests of persons suspected of subversive activities have increased dramatically in the Rio area. An official list of names

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In  Out

Drafted by: POL:RCBrown

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
 CG: CABoonstra

Clearances: DPO: WBMiller

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sent to the military tribunals reveals that 126 persons from the Rio area have been detained, interrogated, and held over pending trial. (Other [redacted] differ with this figure, giving a lower number.) Many other persons, some estimate at least 300, have been taken in for questioning and held for as long as several days before being released. It can be safely concluded that others are also still under detention whose names have not yet been presented to the courts for action. While the largest number of detainees appears to be university students, others, such as journalists, physicians, and university professors have also been picked up and held.

A knowledgeable [redacted] says that the majority of the persons arrested are members or sympathizers of the Partido Comunista do Brasil, the Maoist-oriented Communist party in Brazil. Members of other subversive leftist groups, such as the radical ALN (Aliança Libertadora Nacional), the Castro-ite group RAN (Resistencia Armada Nacional), and the Soviet line PCB (Partido Comunista Brasileiro), have also been caught in the net.

The extensive anti-subversive campaign is being conducted primarily by [redacted]

[redacted] those apprehended are being taken to military prison centers for questioning.

## II. Methods Used to Extract Information

The recent spate of arrests has given rise to numerous reports, several of which Consulate General Rio has been able to substantiate, that the police are using physical and psychological methods to force information out of the suspects. (See Rio's 1310, April 16, 1973, on the Wlacyra Wagner case

[redacted] Though the old forms of torture, such as use of electrical shock devices (the "cattle prod") and tying and hanging the prisoner by his arms and legs from a suspended bar (pau de arara) reportedly have not been abandoned completely, a newer, more sophisticated and elaborate psychophysical duress system is being used to intimidate and terrify the suspect. The ultimate goal of the psychophysical measures, of course, is to extract as much information as possible from the detainee without doing visible, lasting physical harm to his body. The standard pattern of

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treatment, according to persons who have either undergone the series or have talked with persons who have, is as follows:

- 1) The suspect is picked up, usually at gunpoint, and ordered to come with two plainclothes policemen;
- 2) A hood is placed over the detainee's head and he (or she) is forced to lie down in the back of the police vehicle which transports him to the interrogation center;
- 3) The suspect is stripped nude and is made to sit alone in either a completely darkened cell or a refrigerated cell for a period of several hours. This cell is wired with loudspeakers which emit sounds of screaming, sirens, and whistles at high decib[el] levels;
- 4) The detainee is then interrogated by one or more agents who let it be known what crime the police believe the person has committed and what measures might be used against the person if he is uncooperative;
- 5) At this point, if the suspect does not confess, and if it is believed that he is withholding valuable information, he is subjected to increasingly painful physical and mental duress until he confesses. He is placed nude in a small dark room with a metal floor through which electrical current is pulsated. The shock felt by the individual, though reportedly light in intensity, is constant and eventually becomes almost impossible to withstand. The suspect is usually kept in this room for several hours. He may then be transferred to several other "special effects" rooms in which devices are used to instill fear and physical discomfort. Extreme mental and physical fatigue sometimes results, especially if the person undergoes such treatment for two or three days. All during this time, he is not allowed food or water;
- 6) For a period of at least 10 days, the suspect is held incommunicado; if a person is detained when no witnesses are present, his whereabouts or fate is often unknown by relatives for days or weeks.

Two types of suspects are generally not subjected to the application of the entire pattern given above: (1) those who

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are well-known or prominent in society, having "good connections" inside and outside the government, and (2) those who the police believe are key persons in terrorist networks. The former category is usually treated with care and deference so that there will be little, if any, "repercussion." The second category, the hardened terrorist, is mercilessly "squeezed" it is said, for information through the use of the old, more physically brutal/and violent forms of duress. [redacted] He is sometimes eliminated and his death may be reported in the press several days later as having occurred during a "shoot-out" with the police while he was "attempting to escape." One such case is said to be the death of the university student Lincoln Roque, who the press reported was shot by the police on March 22. [redacted]

Many sources contend that the "shoot-out technique" is being used increasingly by the police not only in Rio but throughout Brazil in order to deal with the public relations aspect of eliminating subversives. This technique is said to have been adopted vis-a-vis hardened terrorists or known radical subversives in order to obviate the death-by-torture charges in the international press. EO25x1

### III. Reaction to the Arrests and Interrogation Methods

The recent round-up has provoked rather minimal public reaction. University students at Rio's Catholic University (PUC) organized two or three "protest meetings" on March 15-17 to consider what action to take following the arrest of the university's student body president, Monica Tolipan. (See Rio's A-80, March 21, 1973.)

On March 26, about 70 medical students of the UFRJ (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro) gathered to protest the detention of their school's leader, Lucia Florentina Valle. Students of PUC and the UFF (Universidade Federal Fluminense, located in nearby Niteroi) issued a declaration on March 29 which announced that they would conduct a "silent protest against arbitrary acts." The UFF student support had been enlisted following the arrest a few days earlier of their student body president, Mauricio Jose Ferreira.

Considerable privately expressed reaction to the arrests has been channelled through the CNBB's (National Council of Brazilian Bishops) Secretary General, Dom Ivo Lorscheiter. According to his staff, Dom Ivo has received "a deluge" of pleas

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from parents, close relatives, and friends of those detained asking him to intercede with the authorities on their behalf. Rio's Cardinal Archbishop Eugenio Sales has likewise been approached by numerous relatives of those arrested during recent weeks. Both the CNBB and Sales have in fact called and sent letters to local military officials to inquire about the welfare of the prisoners. (See Rio's A-80, March 21, 1973.)

There is evidence that these reactions have been successful in moderating the heavy hand of the police in several cases. General Frota, Commander of the First Army, has been responsive and has helped insure that restraint is used by the lower levels  Frota's scope of authority, however, does not appear to include full control over the CODI. As the primary coordinator of counter-insurgency, the chief of CODI is believed to take orders directly from Brasilia. This organizational arrangement has reportedly limited Frota's ability to control CODI or the methods it uses to extract information from suspected terrorists.

#### IV. Two Explanations

The reasons for the apparent upsurge of arrests remain somewhat unclear and therefore have been the subject of considerable speculation by cariocas. One explanation heard is that the increased arrests have resulted naturally from detentions made several months ago. Each suspected subversive "fingered" several others to the extent that the detentions multiplied geometrically. Colonel Adyr Fiuza de Castro, Chief of CODI for the First Army area, seemed to confirm this view recently when he told PolOff that the current high rate of detentions resulted from arrests of a few leaders of subversive groups made last December and January. Information obtained from those arrests implicated others who were detained and who, in turn, implicated still others. He confided also that the authorities have been surprised at the extensiveness of the subversives' network which they have been able to "disarticulate" thus far.

Other knowledgeable Brazilians in Rio dismiss this explanation. Some of the area's leading journalists, newspaper editors, civil rights lawyers, and Catholic Church officials who have discussed the subject with PolOff believe that the increased arrest rate is directly related to the presidential succession issue. Among this group the story is circulating that the arrests have been increased because Brazil is in the critical and sensitive period just prior to the time when the successor to Medici will be named. There is a maneuver among the President's closest

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advisors, the story continues, to make the political tranquility of the country appear uncertain and threatened by subversion to such a degree that President Medici might be prevailed upon to continue for at least one more year (some say two) beyond March 1974. General Fontoura, Chief of SNI (National Intelligence Service), is mentioned most often as the author of this plan, though the Chief of the President's Civil Household, Leitão de Abreu, and his Military Household head, General João Baptista de Oliveira Figureido, and others who are closely associated with Medici, are variously credited with abetting the scheme or originating it. These men, the story spells out, oppose retired General Ernesto Geisel's succession to the presidency, and are playing for more time in which to persuade Medici to change his firm resolve to step down in 1974. Some who relate this story add that Medici is being fed "doctored" intelligence reports which paint an alarming picture of subversive activities in the cities as well as in the countryside. The recent arrests are portrayed as uncovering an elaborate and sophisticated network of subversive cells.

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COMMENT

Although the arrests have created an atmosphere of uneasiness and concern among many circles -- e.g. the university, Church, journalists, etc. -- the public reaction has been mild thus far and is likely to continue to be subdued. Basically, people continue to be interested primarily in economic rather than political developments; along with this, there is a prevailing belief that any strong public manifestation organized to expose and criticize the arrests would only make matters worse for those being held and would likely result in other detentions.

As for the story which links the presidential succession to the round-up of subversives, whether some parts or all of it may have basis in reality remains for the future to reveal. It appears now at least that this "story" is a far-fetched product of the area's hyperactive rumor mill. The view that the arrests have increased because of efficient police follow-up as well as the operation of a multiplier factor seems to be a much more plausible and reasonable explanation.

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A final observation is that the successful use by military investigating agents of psychophysical methods to obtain information from subversive suspects does not seem to have stopped them from applying the traditional forms of physical violence on persons believed to be hardened terrorists.

BOONSTRA



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## Message Text

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PAGE 01 SAO PA 00985 081150 Z

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ACTION ARA-17

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AID-20 NIC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09

H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

SS-15 USIA-12 NEA-10 EUR-25 OMB-01 CU-04 SY-10 RSR-01

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R 081115 Z MAY 73

FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4150  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO  
AMCONSUL RECIFE  
AMCONSUL BELEM  
AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE  
AMCONSUL SALVADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAO PAULO 0985

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, BR

SUBJECT: POLITICAL ARRESTS AND TORTURE IN SAO PAULO

REF BRASILIA 2145, RIO DE JANEIRO A-90

1. INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL ARRESTS FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, EITHER FOR TERRORISM OR OTHER POLITICAL OFFENSES, HAVE BEEN CONSTANT IN SAO PAULO OVER THE PAST YEAR. WHILE THE NUMBER MAY VARY FROM MONTH TO MONTH, THE GENERAL LEVEL HAS REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME AS BEST WE CAN TELL.

2. INTERROGATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IS OFTEN ACCOMPANIED BY TORTURE, I. E. THE PARROT' S PERCH, ELECTRIC SHOCKS, STARVATION, ETC. AN MDB CANDIDATE FOR CITY COUNCIL IN SAO PAULO WHO WAS ARRESTED AFTER NOVEMBER MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND HELD FOR SIX WEEKS IN THE MILITARY INTERROGATION CENTER ( OBAN) TOLD US AFTER BEING RELEASED THAT ABOUT 60 POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE  
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KEPT AT INTERROGATION CENTER, ITS APPROXIMATE CAPACITY, DURING MOST OF HIS TIME THERE. MANY WERE PLAINLY INVOLVED IN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BUT OTHERS APPEARED TO BE ONLY POLITICAL IDEALISTS OPPOSED TO THE REGIME. ALL WERE SUBJECTED TO SOME FORM OF TORTURE. HE HIMSELF WAS NOT ABUSED SINCE AS A LEGITIMATE POLITICIAN AND MAN OF MEANS HE WAS NOT " TORTURABLE".

3. ANOTHER SOURCE, A PROFESSIONAL INFORMER AND INTERROGATOR WORKING FOR THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTER IN OSASCO ( INDUSTRIAL SUBURB OF SAO PAULO,) TOLD US ON APRIL 24 OF HIS OWN " COUNTER- SUBVERSIVE" ACTIVITIES. HE EXPLAINED HOW HE HAD BROKEN A " COMMUNIST" RING INVOLVING A CIVIL POLICE OFFICER. THE OFFICER WAS PERSUADED TO TALK BY ATTACHING ELECTRICAL SHOCK DEVICES TO HIS EARS AND TOLD OF HIS CONNECTION WITH A GIRL FRIEND WHO WAS PROMPTLY PICKED UP. SHE WAS UNCOOPERATIVE, HOWEVER, SO SHE WAS PUT ON THE PARROT' S PERCH FOR 43 HOURS WITHOUT FOOD OR WATER. THIS BROKE HER, OUR SOURCE SAID. TORTURE IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER WAS COMMON PRACTICE IN INTERROGATION IN OSASCO. HE ALSO GAVE FIRST- HAND ACCOUNT OF KILLING A SUBERSIVE SUSPECT, WHICH HE CALLED " SEWING" THE SUSPECT UP, I. E. SHOOTING HIM FROM HEAD TO TOES WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPON. ( FOR DETAILS SEE MEMORANDUM OF THIS CONVERSATION DATED APRIL 26). OVER THE PAST YEAR VARIOUS SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ARE KILLED AS MATTER OF STANDARD PRACTICE. WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY AS MANY AS TWELVE HAVE BEEN KILLED IN PAST YEAR IN SAO PAULO AREA.

4. WHILE LEVEL OF POLITICAL ARRESTS AND TORTURE HAS REMAINED MORE OR LESS CONSTANT, THE CONCERN OVER REPRESSION IN SAO PAULO HAS REACHED IN RECENT WEEKS ITS HIGHEST POINT IN YEAR OR SO. FROM TIME TO TIME REPRESSIVE TACTICS OF SECURITY SERVICES AFFECT A PERSON WHO HAS TIES TO THE CHURCH, THE POLITICAL CLASS OR OTHER ELITE GROUPS AND THUS WAKENS INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT. THIS WAS THE CASE TWO YEARS AGO WHEN THE POLICE ARRESTED A PRIEST AND HIS ASSISTANT AND FIRST BROUGHT CARDINAL ARNS INTO OPEN OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME. IT HAS HAPPENED AGAIN IN RECENT WEEKS IN SAO PAULO WITH THE VANNUCHI CASE. THE DISAPPEARANCE AND DEATH OF VANNUCHI FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL YEARS AROUSED THE STUDENT BODY IN SAO PAULO AND THEY ENLISTED THE ASSISTANCE OF CARDINAL ARNS AND OTHER CATHOLIC LEADERS IN PUBLICIZING HIS DEATH ( SAO PAULO' S CONFIDENTIAL

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687 AND 803). THIS CONCERN IS STILL VERY MUCH ALIVE AND STUDENT LEADERS HAVE BEEN SOLICITING BISHOPS AROUND THE STATE TO ENGAGE IN A SERIES OF MASSES LAMENTING HIS DEATH.

5. CONCERN HAS NOW SPREAD BEYOND CHURCH AND STUDENT CIRCLES AND REAWAKENED WIDER INTEREST IN THE REPRESSION TACTICS OF THE REGIME. FOR EXAMPLE, ROBERTO AND RICARCO CIVITA, OWNERS OF

EDITORIA BRIL, BRAZIL'S LARGEST AND MOST INFLUENTIAL PUBLISHING HOUSE, TOLD OUR BPAO LAST WEEK THAT STUDENT UNREST " IS HIGHEST IN OVER TWO YEARS." SECURITY FORCES HAD RAIDED THE UNIVERSITY OF SAO PAULO AND ARRESTED A NUMBER OF STUDENTS. WHEN SUCH OPPRESSION OCCURRED, THERE WERE BOUND TO BE MISTAKES. CARDINAL ARNS WAS VERY CONCERNED AND ROBERTO CIVITA PREDICTED A " MASS TO END ALL MASSES" TO LAMENT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRAZIL. ( COMMENT: THIS IS PROBABLY EXAGGERATED, BUT MANY BISHOPS IN SAO PAULO INTEND TO FOCUS ON THIS ISSUE IN CONNECTION WITH 25 TH ANNIVERSARY THIS YEAR OF UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF MAN OF WHICH BRAZIL IS SIGNATORY.) RICARDO CIVITA OBSERVED THAT MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN PAST HAD RELINQUISHED POWER, BUT THIS ONE HAD ACQUIRED A TASTE FOR KEEPING IT. BOTH CIVITAS EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR EDITORIAL STAFFS WERE DEMORALIZED BECAUSE REGIME PROHIBITED THEM FROM PUBLISHING ANYTHING OF SIGNIFICANCE. ROBERTO SAID HE DREADED DAY WHEN HIS YOUNG SON ASKED " WHAT IS FREEDOM, DADDY?"

4. OTHER SOURCES HAVE ALSO INDICATED TO US INCREASING CONCERN OVER THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRAZIL. FORMER PRESIDENT JANIO QUADROS TOLD US RECENTLY THAT HE EXPECTS A PERIOD OF HIGH TENSION OVER THE NEXT 90 DAYS. HE CLAIMS THAT AT LEAST ONE FOUR-STAR GENERAL SHARES THIS VIEW. QUADROS NOTED THAT THIS FEELING HAD ONLY RECENTLY DEVELOPED AND THAT A MONTH BEFORE, HE HAD PREDICTED A SMOOTH PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND A TRANQUIL YEAR IN BRAZIL.

5. HENCE WE FIND THAT IN SAO PAULO REPRESSION HAS AGAIN BECOME A LIVE ISSUE WHICH CONCERNS A WIDE NUMBER OF LEADERS WHO ARE UNABLE TO EXPLAIN REPRESSIVE PRACTICES AT A TIME WHEN THE REGIME IS MORE STABLE THAN EVER. WHATEVER THE EXPLANATION, THE FEELING HERE IS THAT THIS ADDS A DISTURBING ELEMENT IN A CLIMATE WHICH COULD BECOME TENSE OVER THE SUCCESSION QUESTION. BUT THE RENEWED INTEREST IN REPRESSION DOES NOT MEAN THAT IN

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SAO PAULO THERE HAS BEEN ANY REAL INCREASE, AND IN FACT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A SLIGHT DECREASE, IN POLITICAL ARRESTS AND TORTURE.  
CHAPIN

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL

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30 JUN 2005

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**Subject:** POLITICAL ARRESTS AND TORTURE IN SAO PAULO REF BRASILIA 2145, RIO DE JANEIRO A-90  
**TAGS:** PINT, BR, PINT  
**To:** ARA  
BELEM  
BRASILIA  
PORTO ALEGRE  
RECIFE  
RIO DE JANEIRO  
SALVADOR

SECSTATE WASHDC

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005



Department of State

TELEGRAM

POL 29

MACTION: POL

INFO: CG

DPO RF CHRON

~~SECRET~~

Classification

RECD: 03/0859L JUL 72

R 011515Z JUL 72  
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RIO DE JANEIRO RECIFE SAO PAULO

SECRET BRASILIA 2386

SUBJ: ALLEGATION OF TORTURE IN BRAZIL

REF: STATE 116598 AND 117951

1. IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO HAVE INQUIRED INTO ALLEGED MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN BRAZIL, SPOKESMEN FOR US ADMINISTRATION HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THERE IS VALID BASIS FOR SUCH CHARGES, AND HAVE CITED STATEMENTS BY HIGH BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS WHO, IN ACKNOWLEDGING TRUTH OF ALLEGATIONS, HAVE CLAIMED THIS NOT CONDONED. PEAK OF SUCH REPORTS WAS REACHED IN PERIOD 1968-69, BUT REMAINED AT HIGH LEVEL DURING 1970 AND FIRST HALF OF 1971. WHILE STILL HEARD WITH SOME REQUENCY, THERE HAS BEEN MARKED REDUCTION DURING PAST YEAR OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC REPORTS OF INCIDENTS. THIS REDUCTION IS UNDOUBTEDLY DUE IN GREAT PART TO GOB SUCCESS IN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING NUMBER OF ACTIVE TERRORISTS; NEVERTHELESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A CONSCIOUS POLICY FROM THE TOP TO ELIMINATE THE MORE GROSSLY EXCESSIVE POLICE MEASURES--ESPECIALLY BY MILITARY PERSONNEL--WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE CONTINUING AND NOTABLY SUCCESSFUL BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM.

2. THUS THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT HARSH INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES ARE STILL BEING EMPLOYED AT REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS, IN SOME AREAS AND BY SOME SECURITY UNITS MORE FLAGRANTLY THAN IN OTHERS. DESPITE STRONGLY ADVERSE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY ON QUESTION, AND DESPITE DISTASTE OF AT LEAST MOST HIGH OFFICIALS FOR SUCH MEASURES, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EXCESSES WILL BE TOTALLY ELIMINATED AS LONG AS THIS SECURITY-MINDED GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THERE STILL EXISTS A SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREAT, TO THE ELIMINATION OF WHICH IS ASSIGNED FIRST PRIORITY. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, MANY BRAZILIANS ATTRIBUTE THE SUCCESS OF ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAM TO THE STRENGTH OF MEASURES EMPLOYED AGAINST SUBVERSIVES AND THERE ARE

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INDICATIONS THAT MOST BRAZILIANS EXERCISING INFLUENCE UPON THE REGIME ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM SO LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THESE MEASURES TO BE NECESSARY.

3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, EVENTS WITHIN US CONGRESS, SUCH AS CHURCH HEARINGS OF LAST YEAR AND TUNNEY AMENDMENT, ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE APPRECIABLE EFFECT UPON POLICIES OF GOB. MOREOVER, GIVEN BRAZILIAN PRIDE AND SENSITIVITY ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY, EFFORTS BY ANY BRANCH OF US GOVERNMENT OR BY US POLITICAL FIGURES TO BRING PRESSURE ON BRAZIL WOULD NOT ONLY DAMAGE OUR GENERAL RELATIONS BUT, BY EQUATING REDUCTION IN ANTI-TERROR MEASURES WITH WEAKNESS UNDER PRESSURE, COULD PRODUCE OPPOSITE OF INTENDED RESULT. INDEED SOME BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS ALREADY HAVE EXPRESSED INDIGNATION AT SIZE OF VOTE SUPPORTING THE DEFEATED FIRST TUNNEY AMENDMENT (30 SENATORS) AND FACT THAT AMENDMENT WAS CO-SPONSORED BY PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER. WHILE THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME EFFORT TO DOWNPLAY PUBLICITY REGARDING MATTER, AMENDMENT HAS BEEN STRONGLY DENOUNCED ON FLOOR OF BRAZILIAN CONGRESS AS INTERVENTION WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO EXACERBATION OF ANTI-US SENTIMENT.

4. I AM FULLY AWARE OF ESSENTIALITY OF MAKING CLEAR ON APPROPRIATE OCCASION AND IN APPROPRIATE MANNER THAT ~~USG DOES NOT RPT NOT CONDONE EXCESSES IN THE FORM PRACTICED IN BRAZIL, AND I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE THUS FAR SUCCEEDED IN DOING SO WITHOUT UNDULY JEOPARDIZING OUR RELATIONS WITH THIS COUNTRY OR CAUSING A COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE REACTION ON THE PART OF GOB. I THEREFORE FULLY SHARE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW THAT TUNNEY AMENDMENT OR SIMILAR MOVE IS NOT APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR EXPRESSION OF US CONCERN OVER MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS. MOREOVER, WITH RESPECT TO NEW FORMULATION CONTAINED IN STATE 117951, IT OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT NOW OR AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE TO BE IN A POSITION REALISTICALLY TO CERTIFY THAT THE GOB IS NOT ENGAGED IN TORTURE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. INDEED, I DO NOT SEE HOW ANY SUCH NEGATIVE CERTIFICATION WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITH RESPECT TO ANY COUNTRY, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, SIMPLY BECAUSE THERE IS NO WAY OF ASCERTAINING WHETHER OR NOT OVERZEALOUS POLICE OFFICIALS, ACTING WITH OR WITHOUT AUTHORITY, ENGAGE IN PRACTICES OF THIS SORT.~~

*n.e.  
never  
by saying  
nothing*

5. I THEREFORE STRONGLY SUPPORT DEPARTMENT'S EFFORTS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SAO PAULO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

TO DISSUADE SENATORS FROM ADVANCING THE NEW PROPOSAL,  
AND TO ENCOURAGE ITS DEFEAT IF OFFERED. IN LIEU  
THEREOF WE SHOULD CONTINUE QUIETLY ON OUR PRESENT COURSE  
WHICH IS MORE CONDUCIVE TO ULTIMATE SUCCESS, AND  
CERTAINLY MORE CONSISTENT WITH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN  
SOVEREIGN STATES WHICH SHARE ENORMOUS COMMON INTERESTS. GP-3  
ROUNTREE

DB:0940L

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FORM FS-412(H)  
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Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO

June 8, 1971

The Esquadrão da Morte (Death Squad)

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Summary

In the last ten years over 300 murders with many characteristics in common have occurred in the major cities of Brazil. The basic similarities have been the "ritual" surrounding the killings and the fact that they are all unsolved. These brutal deaths have attracted widespread Brazilian and international press treatment and have been attributed to aptly named "death squads" (Esquadrões da Morte or EM). Although there are variations in the explanations of the death squad phenomenon, it is almost universally believed that these crimes are the work of off-duty policemen who, lacking confidence in the formal Brazilian legal system to control crime, band together in local vigilante groups to execute those identified as habitual and irredeemable criminals.

To date the various local, state and federal governments for the most part have reacted by looking the other way. On several occasions individual officials have stated that the Esquadrão would be investigated and destroyed. All such efforts have produced little beyond more press coverage.

The last several weeks have witnessed an upsurge in news about death squads. First there has been an

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CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JUN 21 1971

POL:DMBlatt/WGWalker:rgH 6/8/71 DCM:CABoonstra  
 POL/R:KKStevens B/POL:SLow (in draft)  
 DAO:ColAMoura

SAO PAULO, BRAZIL

in the number of victims found in the streets of Rio after a relatively quiet spell. Second, the Supreme Court refused habeas corpus to Sergio Fleury, the man thought of by many people as the symbol of the São Paulo Esquadrão, thus theoretically preparing the way for his prosecution on several murder charges. And last, the newspapers have begun another of their campaigns to demand that some action be taken. The following general history and description of the Esquadrão da Morte is intended to give a simple overview of the problem while it remains in its present form. It could quickly become even more complex.

### Introduction

In the past decade, one of the recurring themes that from time to time has captured the imagination and headlines of the local and international press has been the alleged existence in Brazil of so-called "death squads." Each incident attributable either in fact or in the imagination of the reporter to the Esquadrão automatically has received extensive local press play (particularly in the mass-appeal papers), and several of the more spectacular multiple-victim killings have been reported by the international media.

The death squad is generally described and almost universally believed to be composed chiefly of off-duty policemen in the metropolitan areas who, unwilling to accept what they view as a legal system which stymies their best efforts to control crime and criminals, take the law into their own hands by summarily executing those they identify as "habitual criminals."

Various sub-theories extend this description. One is that the death squad is really a crude but effective tool of the establishment to keep the poorest segments of the urban population, principally the favela dwellers who are often thought to be "beyond the law" in their un-policed ghettos, afraid of venturing out and committing crimes against the middle and upper-classes. A second theory proposes that the Esquadrão murders are not the result of the good guys (policemen) eliminating bad guys (criminals beyond the normal grasp of the law). This hypothesis is that the killings result from either (a) internal battles within the underworld, principally over competition for territories of

narcotics or the local variation of the numbers racket (jôgo de bicho), or (b) the efforts of dishonest police to keep the rackets under their personal control. Under these latter theories, the murders once committed are given the trappings of the "classical" Esquadrão ceremony, and thus put into the lightly-treated category of death squad executions. Other theories abound.

There are also various explanations of why so little has been done to investigate and bring a halt to these killings. Given the poor image of Brazil generated abroad by such recurrent stories of vigilantism, and given the GOB's professed concern with its poor foreign image derived in part from other allegations of repressive practices by its police forces, it is difficult to understand why the GOB would not energetically (1) attempt to discover if the Esquadrão does in fact exist, and (b) crush it if it does. Brazilian officialdom has adopted various postures vis-à-vis the Esquadrão problem. Their proponents fall roughly into the following categories: (1) those who deny its very existence by claiming all such stories are the fabrications of overimaginative and sensationalist-oriented newsmen who pin the death squad label on isolated and non-connected acts of violence; (2) those who accept the existence of the Esquadrão and the popular version of the forces behind it, but rationalize its existence as "justified" given the underdeveloped state of the police in Brazil and the cumbersome, excessively lenient, and often corrupt or incompetent Brazilian juridical system which is incapable of fighting the criminal elements spawned in today's urban centers; (3) others who deplore the Esquadrão but feel nothing can be done to fight it in face of its close official connections; and (4) those few who are attempting to battle and destroy the Esquadrão.

One might suspect that with the present degree of GOB control over the press, stories dealing with a subject with such potentially damaging impact on Brazil's image would be heavily censored by the authorities. Such is not the case. The following historical description was garnered almost exclusively from press sources. From those herein identified - The Jornal do Brasil, Correio da Manhã, O Estado de São Paulo, et al - it can be seen that even the most responsible Brazilian papers have given in-depth and compre-

ensive coverage to the Esquadrão. It is our impression that none of the prestige papers treats the Esquadrão as anything other than a confirmed and describable fact. It should be kept in mind, however, that the lack of any solid official investigation into the EM has left the field open for journalists to employ their often well-developed imaginative and speculative powers when writing about the Esquadrão. The following account might therefore be exaggerated. Even if it is, it represents the most accurate description available to the Brazilian public and one that, in the absence of authoritative evidence to the contrary, is widely accepted as accurate.

### Historical Summary

In 1958, the government of the State of Guanabara, concerned with rampant criminalism, gave carte blanche authority to delegado (equivalent to an American chief of detectives) Cecil Bocer to deal with the spiraling crime problem. General Amauri Kruehl, then Chief of Police of the Federal District, created a special unit within the state Secretariat of Public Security to "deal in whatever way" with the bandits. Bodies of marginais (small-time hoodlums) began to appear on the streets of Rio, their deaths attributed to unknown authors (19 cases in total). Inquiries into these murders were never begun.

This first era of what was in time to become the Esquadrão da Morte ended when a detective killed a TV cameraman, mistakenly thinking that he was a bandit marked for death. The press and public outcry was enough to end the murders for several years.

It was not until 1964 that news of the EM again was reported in the papers. At that time, a small-time hoodlum who was assaulting and robbing in the North Zone of Rio killed Detective Milton Le Coq in an exchange with police. A price was put on the assassin's head and several groups of police banded together to capture him. The ensuing hunt resulted in the second step of the development of EM, the creation of the "Escuderie Le Coq."

The "Escuderie Le Coq" is a fairly open organization, with police members often posting its emblem in their precinct offices. The Correio da Manhã estimated that under President Euclides Nascimento and Honorary President David Nasser (a pro-Government Rio journalist), the Escuderie at the present time has 4000 members in Brazil - 1000 in Guanabara, 500 in São Paulo, 350

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in Minas Gerais, 200 in Rio Grande do Sul, 50 in Pernambuco, and the rest scattered throughout the interior. It further states that of the 4000, 50% are police and the rest are judges, prosecutors, lawyers, military and journalists.

Crimes Attributable to Esquadrão

Since 1968 until today, more than 800 mysterious deaths have been attributed to the Esquadrão, 200 in Niterói alone in a two-year period and 182 in a one-and-a-half year period in São Paulo - an average of two per week. All the crimes have had characteristics in common:

- (1) the victims are almost always marginais (small-time crooks, drug dealers, people on the fringe of the law);
- (2) the victims are all shot many times with large caliber weapons, and tied with nylon cords;
- (3) the bodies are left in deserted places in the early morning;
- (4) a sign with the EM symbol and phrases such as "I was a bandit" are left with the corpse;
- (5) calls are made to newspapers saying where the body can be found;
- (6) the police don't question any suspects and the case is closed for lack of evidence.

The Jornal do Brasil has described the enactment of a typical EM crime as follows:

"Those chosen to die are generally caught by the death squad in the street and taken to a place used as a hideout, or many times to the police station itself, where the suffering of the victim begins. Cigarette burns on the body, electric shocks in sensitive places, and a beating are the principle castigations in this phase.

Afterwards comes the final part, the placement of the victim in the trunk of a car which will take him to a quiet place. There the victim is tied by a cord and made to run, then his killers shoot. The man dies strangled and ridden with bullets. In order to complete the scene, the killers place a white cardboard sign with the design of a skull and crossbones and the chosen words of hate beside the initials EM - representing the symbol of the Escuderie Le Coq - saying that there lies a bandit."

In São Paulo, the victims of the Esquadrão have a further common characteristic. After the first deaths, all in revenge for deaths of policemen, the São Paulo Esquadrão appears to be dedicating itself to the elimination of drug dealers. Of the 143 deaths attributed to the Esquadrão through mid-1970, 120 were involved in the drug traffic.

In the first few years of activity, all signs left with victims were the same - the skull and crossbones and the initials EM. Since late 1969, however, new symbols have begun to appear with the bodies indicating the appearance of new groups emulating the original EM. Fatos e Fotos, a weekly magazine, charted the appearance of these new symbols and described the operation of the Esquadrão and splinter groups along geographic lines. The original Esquadrão operates in Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, and São Paulo; O China (symbolized by a Fu Man Chu appearing Chinese) in Guanabara and Rio; Killing in Guanabara; and SOMBRA (symbolized by a head covered with a lady's nylon stocking) in Espirito Santo.

The Esquadrão itself remains the strongest in terms of numbers of victims, extent of operation, and sophistication of organization. In both São Paulo and Rio, the repeated telephone calls to newspapers to announce the location of corpses and future victims have led to names being assigned to the feminine voices. In Rio, she is known as Rosa Vermelha, and in São Paulo, Lírio Branco.

The Brazilian press has not hesitated in linking the squad with the police (see Rio's A-178, of March 21, 1969). Each "hit"

is fully covered in the press under standard Esquadrão banner-lines, explicitly implicating the police. Editorial comment is frank, as witnessed by the following Jornal do Brasil editorial of November 1970:

"The Esquadrão da Morte is the fruit of a crisis of authority in the entire police apparatus in Brazil. In Rio, its elements are probably recruited from those same police who travel through the city in trucks, many times without lights, negligently manned; by police who appear to be vagabonds looking for a fight; arrogant beings who transgress all traffic laws. They who consider themselves to be above the law are those who should be the first to respect it in order to teach all to respect it."

High police and security officials continue to deny the participation of police in Esquadrão activities. The Superintendent of Police in the State of Rio considers the EM to exist but as "a Brazilian version of North American gangsters." The Secretary of Security for the State of Rio and the Superintendent of the State of Rio Civil Police are both adamant in refusing to agree that the EM exists, claiming its existence to be the product of a fertile public imagination.

#### Attempts to Deal with the Situation

800 bodies murdered by unknown authors, in circumstances never investigated, resulting in inquiries closed before they really opened, suggest more than fertile public imagination.

High-level state officials' refusal to consider the EM to be organized or to involve the police makes state justice efforts nearly impossible. One public prosecutor blamed the lack of progress on paltry police resources. Others blame the failure to investigate not on the lack of resources, but on the climate of fear generated by apparent official connivance and approval.

The demands of the press and the embarrassing number of unsolved crimes attributed to the Esquadrão finally prompted the Governor of the State of Rio to create a special commission

to deal with the EM. Established in April 1970, this three-man Special Investigative Commission was charged with examining cases attributed to the EM. The life of the Special Commission expired at the end of January 1971 without any progress being made. In its final report, the Commission attributed more than 400 crimes committed in the State of Rio in three years to the EM, with a suggestion for dealing with only one of them. It further stated that it found the homicide division "inefficient" and it "unjustifiable that it had solved so few crimes of unidentified victims."

After years of state inaction, the end of 1970 saw appeals for federal intervention such as this editorial from the Jornal do Brasil:

"It no longer helps to appeal to the state authorities. The federal police must intervene. There must be in the national security concept some way to protect the common security of our citizens."

After the murder of 11 marginais in São Paulo in July 1970 in reprisal for the killing of a policeman (reftel São Paulo 699, 7/24/70), Judge Nelson Fonseca requested federal intervention to deal with the EM. The Judge called EM crimes "crimes against the national security." He stated that the Esquadrão, composed of police, does exist, and accused police officials of being responsible for the difficulty in obtaining proof against the EM.

In August 1970, Justice Minister Buzaid, in response to a proliferation of these crimes and requests from certain officials, moved to prompt further action by state authorities against the Esquadrão. He threatened, in effect, to turn the matter over to the federal police (reftel Rio's 5575, 8/5/70).

Buzaid's threat seemed to spur state action for a short period. In several states, investigations were pursued and several accused were brought to trial. In Espirito Santo, a trial of police believed connected with the Esquadrão terminated without conviction. In the State of Rio de Janeiro, the trial of João da Silva Coelho, accused of belonging to the EM, ended on October 13, 1970, when he died of a heart attack while in prison. Two policemen, said to be members of the Esquadrão, were tried and convicted



of murder in São Gonçalo, State of Rio, on January 29, 1971 (see Rio A-46). Though this may aid in future progress of EM cases, they were tried and convicted for an isolated murder and not for being members of the Esquadrão, nor for committing the specific crime in their capacity as members.

The greatest amount of state action against the Esquadrão is occurring in São Paulo. Hélio Pereira Bicudo, a state prosecutor, was named to begin an investigation of the EM. He and Judge Nelson Fonseca have opened investigations of many cases, accused the police in several instances, and begun trial proceedings. One of these cases is that concerning the murder of 11 marginais in reprisal for the killing of a police investigator. In the brief presented by Hélio Bicudo, he stated that eight of the victims actually had been removed from custody in the Presidio Tiradentes prison to be killed. According to the O Estado de São Paulo, this was done with the knowledge of the prison director who later falsified documents to cover the event. The judge still hasn't decided whether or not to process the case.

Other investigations of Hélio Bicudo have borne some fruit. One of his processes against three policemen hopefully will move to the jury trial stage soon. They are to be tried under the penal code and are accused of belonging to the EM.

His second denunciation in October of 16 police in a 1968 Esquadrão murder is now in the phase of pre-trial defense testimony. A third denunciation by Bicudo (December 1970) of six policemen in the murder of a common crook involves Sergio Fleury, a São Paulo delegado who in many minds symbolizes police involvement in the EM. Fleury is a legendary figure in São Paulo police circles. He is held responsible for having masterminded the elimination of Brazil's number one terrorist, Carlos Marighella, in late 1969, and his successor, João Camara Ferreira, one year later. In answer to the death squad murder charge, Fleury asked that a writ of habeas corpus be applied by the Supreme Federal Tribunal in cases of persons charged with being members of the Esquadrão. A fourth denunciation by Bicudo (February 1971) also accuses Sergio Fleury, along with six other policemen, in the death of three drug dealers killed in December 1968. Fleury requested habeas corpus in this case too.

In early June, in what some observers judge to be a serious blow to the Esquadrão and the first evidence that the federal government no longer intends to look the other way, the Supreme Court denied Fleury's habeas corpus petitions. The criminal process can now proceed.

### Jurisdictional Dispute

The decision by the Federal Supreme Court on the Fleury appeal was awaited with great interest in government circles. This was due primarily to the jurisdictional dispute raging between the office of the Federal Attorney General and the São Paulo State Attorney General. The federal officer considers there to be no clear indication of Fleury's guilt and that Bicudo's inquiries are based on an illegal premise. The State Attorney General upholds the legality of the function exercised by Bicudo, and that the case against Fleury contains clear and precise imputation of his crimes. The Supreme Court decision apparently supports the latter thesis.

Jurisdiction is further complicated by the favorable dispatch by the Judge Auditor of a petition by a military attorney which requests that all cases concerning the Esquadrão currently in process in courts of common justice be transferred to military jurisdiction. The Judge Auditor sent the request to the Supreme Federal Tribunal and suspended all cases in progress until the Supreme Court decides on that jurisdictional conflict. The question is whether crimes of the Esquadrão are common crimes to be judged under the civil penal code, and therefore in civil courts, or crimes against the national security, which require military processing.

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COMMENT: Where the truth in all this lies is sometimes difficult to determine. It is a fact that at least eight hundred unsolved, and mostly uninvestigated, murders have occurred in the last few years which have been identified in the public mind as the work of the Esquadrão. For a story like the Esquadrão to have received such wide popular acceptance is certainly a comment on the Brazilian public image of its police, and a commentary on the entire criminal justice procedure as well. Brazilian lawyers willingly admit that the process of criminal justice is in a deplorable state. The courts have traditionally been overcrowded,

inefficient, and often arbitrary. Events in Brazil since the Revolution have added to these defects by placing the entire judicial branch in an even more inferior posture vis-à-vis the executive branch than it traditionally was. The disruption of due process of law incorporated in the institutional act concept, particularly IA-5's exclusion from juridical review of all actions under it and other IA's, could only have the effect of undermining the public's, and their law enforcement's, confidence in the judiciary.

The inability of the judiciary, when faced with the staggering number of unsolved murders attributed to the death squads, to demand and receive full executive support in investigations suggests serious inter-branch government problems. The apparent ability of the states to implicitly defy the federal Minister of Justice when he attempted to force them to employ the state police apparatus against the EM also suggests an inherent lack of discipline within the system. The jurisdictional dispute among the competing state, federal, and military judiciaries further weakens the process. With all the inherent problems of the system, it is perhaps easy to understand the motivation of members of the Esquadrão for substituting their own, more direct concept of law enforcement.

Understanding the GOB reaction to date is somewhat more difficult. It can be argued that the present government, overwhelmingly concerned as it is with the problems of internal security and the elimination of a terrorist threat, does not choose to do anything that would demoralize or handicap its security forces. If this is the reason behind the policy of official inaction, it is not without long-term risks.

Until now the vast majority of the victims, outside of an occasional case of mistaken identity, have been from the poorest classes, those with the least ability or predilection to protest. It is easy to conceive of the practitioners of this type of vigilantism, becoming ever more convinced of their being above the law, branching out and executing others for payment, spite, or any of a multitude of reasons. Perhaps it will only be when victims begin appearing who are no longer from among the voiceless classes, but who have access to channels of complaint, that a serious effort will be made to curb the Esquadrões.

ROUNTREE

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POL-29  
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MONTH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 7, 1970

SUBJECT: Conditions in DEOPS Prison as Told by  
Detained American Citizen

PARTICIPANTS: Robert H. Horth, Director of Statistics, AGROCERES  
Peter Jon de Vos, Political Officer  
Harold Rabinowitz, Agricultural Officer

DATE: September 30, 1970

PLACE: Rubayat Restaurant

DETAINED AT AIRPORT

Mr. Robert Henry Horth, a 30 year old American citizen, was detained by the Sao Paulo DEOPS authorities on September 6, 1970, and held incommunicado until his release to a consular officer three days later. Tall, clean cut, and fluent in Portuguese, he has been in Brazil slightly more than two years employed as Director of Statistics by AGROCERES, a Brazilian seed company in which IBEC has a large holding. His title of Director of Statistics is somewhat of a subterfuge, since his real function is that of "trouble-shooter" and "watchdog" for IBEC's interests.

Mr. Horth related that he had been apprehended while passing through the immigration formalities at Viracopos International Airport on his return to Brazil from attending a "Science for Survival" conference in Washington, D.C. While awaiting the return of his passport, he was approached by several Brazilian authorities who escorted him into a separate room where they began to question him politely but firmly regarding his identity and the purpose of his travelling to Brazil. His truthful explanations were to no avail and, although he asked repeatedly, he was not informed as to the reason for his detention. §

§ The Brazilian authorities had received a lookout list containing the names of a number of members of the extremist Weatherman group. The name of Robert Henry Roth, appeared on this list. The similarity of Horth's name to that of Roth apparently led to the former's arrest.

POL:PJdeVos:mb  
Clearance:AGRI:HRabinowitz (in draft)  
EXEC:FXLambert

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Mr. Horth related that, following several hours at the airport, he was then transferred with his luggage to the DEOPS downtown prison in Sao Paulo. His requests for permission to contact his company were refused on the grounds that "political prisoners are not permitted telephone contacts". This was the first inkling he had of the motive for his arrest. He immediately surmised that perhaps a disgruntled employee of AGROCERES, harmed in some way by Horth's recently implemented reforms in the company, had fabricated some incriminating charge concerning his activities in Brazil and had denounced him to the security authorities. At the DEOPS prison he was registered, allowed to select a pair of his own shoes and underwear from his luggage, given prison garb and placed in a cell with six other inmates. His remaining possessions, itemized and placed in safekeeping, were returned to him upon his release.

### CELLMATES TORTURED

Mr. Horth quickly became acquainted with his cellmates, all of whom were under thirty years of age. All of them were being detained as suspected political subversives and had already been in jail from six months to several weeks. None of them had been legally charged or given any explanation of why they were suspected as subversives. However, each of them said that he had been subjected to torture shortly after his admittance to the prison. After the initial interrogation, in an apparent attempt by the authorities to determine whether or not the prisoner was telling the truth, each had been brought to a special room located in the bowels of the DEOPS prison and subjected to a period of torture. The "pau de arara" was one method used. Another was subjecting the victim to electrical shocks at various places on the body, including the sexual organs. Still another torture was "The Telephone," whereby the prisoner is bound to a chair and an interrogator, standing behind, smashes his cupped hands over the victim's ears, in some cases bursting the eardrums by the resultant pressure. When satisfied that nothing further was to be gained from such treatment, the prisoner was then confined to his cell, normally holding six to eight individuals. In no case had a prisoner been retortured.

Mr. Horth emphasized that he himself had not been mistreated in any fashion, probably because of his foreign nationality. The worst part of the ordeal for him had been the inability to communicate with the outside and the uncertainty of why he was being held. As he had no fixed travel schedule, his company would not have missed him for some time.

### PRISON CONDITIONS

Mr. Horth said that conditions in the DEOPS prison are generally considered by the inmates to be far superior to those existing in the military jails or in the Tiradentes Prison. In the DEOPS prison the inmates are able to communicate among themselves with a great deal of facility and often pass notes, food, cigarettes, etc. via the guards. Prisoners are exercised twice weekly and may receive visitors. Mr. Horth said that there were six separate cells approximately the size of his own, and that one was filled with young girls, several of whom were pregnant. He could not vouch for the treatment of prisoners outside his cell, but had "heard" that upon their initial admittance terrible things had been done to them to make them talk. None of the prisoners had the vaguest idea how long he might be confined. However, Mr. Horth noted a continuing changeover as persons were released and new inmates admitted. Among the new arrivals, he noted several who were in a state of shock and affected by nervous twitching as a consequence of their torture session.

### CELLMATES ARE INNOCENT

In Mr. Horth's opinion, five of the six in his cell were absolutely innocent of subversive political activity. The sixth, a former student at the USP Faculty of Philosophy, "looked like he might easily throw a bomb" and, while friendly, carefully shied away from discussing political topics with the American. Two were students at the USP Faculty of Economics who appeared to be quite naive about present-day Brazilian politics or political philosophy in general; they claimed they only desired to return to their studies. Two others were common construction laborers who had been apprehended while residing in a rented room in a building in which also lived a group of suspected terrorists (who were not present at the time of the raid and escaped). Mr. Horth recalled that the principal concern of these workmen was that as minimum wage earners they simply did not earn enough to support themselves. One of them even concluded that life in prison was comparatively better than on the outside since he had been tortured only once and received three decent meals daily as well as a dry place to sleep. The last cellmate was an adventurous youth who had been a charter pilot in the state of Mato Grosso until opening a profitable nightclub in a Sao Paulo suburb about a year ago. The nightclub owner's main gripe was that he was losing a great deal of money as a result of his detention. In all cases, according to Mr. Horth, the prisoners blamed "the system" for what was happening to them, and surprisingly they did not seem to bear a grudge toward the Brazilian government or towards individuals. On the contrary, they all praised President Medici and expressed high regard for his programs.

NO PROTEST PLANNED

While temporarily shaken up by this unfortunate episode caused by mistaken identity, Mr. Horth desires to remain and work in Brazil. As an intelligent and sensible person, he philosophically accepted the apologies of the DEOPS authorities for their error and has no intention of pursuing the matter. At the same time, he is very much aware of the need for government officialdom and that element of foreign business closely identified in the public eye with the GOB to open a dialogue with the people, especially with the university students. To this end, he is most anxious to become involved in the local scene and requested that he be included in any seminars, meetings, etc. which might be sponsored by the American Chamber of Commerce or the Consulate General.

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EXCISE

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ARA:HUSHLAUDERMAN  
S/S: MR. REDDY  
INF - ROGER KIRK

P - PHILIP HABIB

IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE, SANTIAGO  
IMMEDIATE, LA PAZ IMMEDIATE  
IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, ASUNCION IMMEDIATE

ROGER CHANNEL

E.O. 11652, SECRET EXDS-2

TAGS: PINTA, PINS, PINT, AR, UY

SUBJECT: OPERATION CONDOR

Chile Project (=S199900006)  
U.S. Department of State  
Release  Excise  Deny  Declass  
Exemption(s) 61 33

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1. YOU ARE AWARE OF A SERIES OF [ ] REPORTS ON "OPERATION CONDOR." THE COORDINATION OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS PROBABLY UNDERSTANDABLE. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT PLANNED AND DIRECTED ASSASSINATIONS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF CONDOR MEMBERS HAS MOST SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS WHICH WE MUST FACE SQUARELY AND RAPIDLY.

2. IN CONSIDERING HOW MOST EFFECTIVELY TO BRING OUR CONCERNS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED:

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN THE THREE KEY CONDOR COUNTRIES ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

-- WE WANT TO DEMONSTRATE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS OUR APPRECIATION OF REAL HOST GOVERNMENT CONCERNS AND THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY.

-- WE PROPOSE TO ENGAGE THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA, URUGUAY AND BOLIVIA IN A BROAD DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES AND SECURITY QUESTIONS INVOLVE

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3. FOR BUENOS AIRES, MONTEVIDEO AND SANTIAGO: YOU SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH HIGHEST APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL, PREFERABLY THE CHIEF OF STATE, TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE USG IS AWARE FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, INCLUDING HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, THAT THERE IS A DEGREE OF INFORMATION, EXCHANGE AND COORDINATION AMONG VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN CONE WITH REGARD TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE AREA. THIS WE CONSIDER USEFUL.

B. THERE ARE IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, RUMORS THAT THIS COOPERATION MAY EXTEND BEYOND INFORMATION EXCHANGE TO INCLUDE PLANS FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF SUBVERSIVES, POLITICIANS AND PROMINENT FIGURES BOTH WITHIN THE NATIONAL BORDERS OF CERTAIN SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES AND ABROAD.

C. WHILE WE CANNOT SUBSTANTIATE THE ASSASSINATION RUMORS, WE FEEL IMPELLED TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION OUR DEEP CONCERN. IF THESE RUMORS WERE TO HAVE ANY SHRED OF TRUTH, THEY WOULD CREATE A MOST SERIOUS MORAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEM.

D. COUNTER-TERRORIST ACTIVITY OF THIS TYPE WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE PUBLIC WORLD CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED.

E. WE ARE MAKING SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS IN CERTAIN OTHER CAPITALS (WITHOUT SPECIFYING).

4. FOR BUENOS AIRES: YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO ADD TO YOUR APPROACH THE FOLLOWING POINTS IF YOU DEEM IT APPROPRIATE:

A. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF SECURITY THREATS CREATED BY TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN ARGENTINA. IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ATTEMPT TO ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA ON HOW BEST TO GET ITS INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM UNDER CONTROL.

B. ACTIVITY ALONG LINES OF 2-B. WOULD HAVE SERIOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ARGENTINE IMAGE ABROAD IN GENERAL AND FOREIGN REFINANCING EFFORTS OF MARTINEZ DE HOZ, IN PARTICULAR.

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

1 3

C. IN CONNECTION WITH PARA 2.D., YOU SHOULD INCLUDE STATEMENT OF OUR PROFOUND CONCERN REGARDING ATTACKS ON REFUGEES FROM WHATEVER QUARTER IN ARGENTINA AND MAKE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SOME 30 URUGUAYANS WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED AND ABOUT WHOM WE MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO AMBASSADOR MUSICH IN WASHINGTON.

D. WE ARE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE PERIODIC EXCHANGES WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA OF INFORMATION ON THE GENERAL LEVEL AND MODE OF COMMUNIST AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE HEMISPHERE AND ELSEWHERE IF THE GOA WOULD BE INTERESTED. (FYI: WE WOULD PLAN TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND MATERIAL TO YOU LATER TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR ORAL EXCHANGES AT A LEVEL AGREED UPON JOINTLY WITH THE GOA.)

5. FOR MONTEVIDEO: WE ASSUME YOUR BEST APPROACH IS TO GENERAL VADORA RATHER THAN TO EITHER ACTING PRESIDENT OR PRESIDENT DESIGNATE WHO APPARENTLY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT OPERATION CONDOR AND, IN ANY EVENT, WOULD PROBABLY HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE ON SITUATION. YOU MAY USE TALKING POINT D. IN PARAGRAPH 4 ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IF YOU CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE.

6. FOR SANTIAGO: DISCUSS [ ] THE POSSIBILITY OF A PARALLEL APPROACH BY HIM.

7. FOR LA PAZ: WE AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION (LA PAZ 3657) AS YOU SEE. WHILE WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT INSTRUCTING YOU TO MAKE THE SPECIFIC DEMARCHE ON CONDOR, YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION WITH BANIER OR OTHER SENIOR GOB OFFICIAL TO PROPOSE PERIODIC EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION SUCH AS CONTAINED IN PARA 4.D. ABOVE.

8. YOU WILL BE AWARE OF EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF POINTS E.B. AND E.C. GREAT CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO GO BEYOND PHRASING USED.

10. FOR ALL ACTION AND INFO ADDRESSEES: YOU SHOULD OF COURSE BE CERTAIN THAT NO AGENCY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN EXCHANGING INFORMATION OR DATA ON INDIVIDUAL SUBVERSIVES WITH HOST GOVERNMENT. EVEN IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE WE PROPOSE TO EXPAND OUR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE IN NO WAY FINGER INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT BE CANDIDATES FOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS.

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FORM DS 322A(038)

11. WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED -- NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS -- NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/  
CONSULTANTS. 44

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 4155

SPECIAL HANDLING

Access# 980643000018 safe 14 Drawer 5 Box U16

PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 08210 241613Z

47  
ACTION INRD-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 /009 W

105847 4 EXCISE

O 241530Z AUG 76  
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1000

S F C R F T SANTIAGO 8210

SECRET CHANNEL

FROM AMBASSADOR

FO 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PINT, AR, UY, CI  
SUBJECT: OPERATION CONDOR

REF: STATE 209192

Chile Project (#S199900030)  
U.S. Department of State  
Release \_\_\_\_\_ Excise  Deny \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify: In Part  In Full \_\_\_\_\_  
Exemption(s) B 1, B 3

Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir  
( ) Classify as (  ) Extend as (  ) Downgrade to \_\_\_\_\_  
Date 2/1/01 Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_ Reason 25X1

1. WHILE I APPRECIATE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE SOUGHT IN REFTEL, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT AN APPROACH TO PRESIDENT PINOCHET IS THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE IT.

2. IN MY JUDGMENT, GIVEN PINOCHET'S SENSITIVITY REGARDING PRESSURES BY USG, HE MIGHT WELL TAKE AS AN INSULT ANY INFERENCE THAT HE WAS CONNECTED WITH SUCH ASSASSINATION PLOTS. FURTHERMORE, COOPERATION AMONG SOUTHERN CONE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IS HANDLED BY THE DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DINA), APPARENTLY WITHOUT MUCH REFERENCE TO ANY ONE ELSE. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE, EVEN PROBABLE, THAT PINOCHET HAS NO KNOWLEDGE WHATEVER OF OPERATION CONDOR, PARTICULARLY OF ITS MORE QUESTIONABLE ASPECTS.

3. PURPOSE OF INSTRUCTION WILL BE BEST ACHIEVED IF HE CONVEYS THE MESSAGE TO [REDACTED] HE CAN DO IT IN THE CONTEXT OF HAVING HEARD A RUMOR WHICH HE CANNOT BELIEVE, BUT WHICH IF SUBSTANTIATED WOULD BE DISASTROUS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02

SANTIA 08210 241613Z

FOR THE PERPETRATORS. [REDACTED] BELIEVE THIS  
WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF GETTING THE MESSAGE  
ACROSS WITHOUT UNDESIRABLE COMPLICATTONS.

4. I NOTE THAT THE INSTRUCTION IS CAST IN URGENT TERMS.  
HAS DEPARTMENT RECEIVED ANY WORD THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT  
ASSASSINATION ACTIVITIES ARE IMMINENT? THE ONLY SUCH INFO  
WE HAVE SEEN IS ONE REPORT FROM [REDACTED] UNCONFIRMED BY  
OTHER SOURCES.

5. PLEASE ADVISE.  
POPPER

~~SECRET~~

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Chile Project (#S199900030)  
U.S. Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D.C. 20520

(10137)  
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Release \_\_\_\_\_ Excise  Deny \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify: In Part  In Full  B1  
Exemption(s) B1, B3CA, NR NR

**UNCLASSIFIED**

August 30, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting, 27 August 1976

PARTICIPANTS: ARA - Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman,  
Mr. William Luers; CIA - [redacted]  
[redacted] INR/DDC - Francis De Tarr

Chile Project (#S199900030)

U.S. Department of State

Release \_\_\_\_\_ Excise \_\_\_\_\_ Deny \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify: In Part \_\_\_\_\_ In Full \_\_\_\_\_

Exemption(s) \_\_\_\_\_

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.

( ) Classify as ( ) Extend as (5) Downgrade to

Date 11/16/81 Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_ Reason 25X

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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NR

Operation Condor

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said that [redacted] is very concerned about making representations concerning Operation Condor (notes for meeting of August 3)

B1

[redacted] said that [redacted] knowledge concerning Operation Condor is fairly widespread in the cone countries.

B1

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said that we are not making a representation to Pinochet as it would be futile to do so,

B1

[redacted] Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said representations [redacted] could be combined with representations in Washington.

NR

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Page 3 has been eliminated because it is entirely irrelevant.

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Secret



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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AN: 0760356-0146

PAGE 01 SAN JO 04526 2018302

43  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 150-00 550-00 /026 W  
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FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5110

SECRET SAN JOSE 4526

EXDIS

FOR ARA-LUERS FROM SMLAUDEMAN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PINT, AR, CL, NY  
SUBJECT: OPERATION CONDOR

REF: STATE 231604 - NO RECORD

UNLESS THERE IS SOME COMPLICATION I AM UNAWARE OF, THERE  
WOULD SEEM TO BE NO REASON TO WAIT MY RETURN. YOU CAN SIMPLY  
INSTRUCT THE AMBASSADORS TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION,  
NOTING THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS IN SOME WEEKS  
INDICATING AN INTENTION TO ACTIVATE THE CONDOR SCHEME. TODMAN

SECRET

EXDIS REVIEW

- Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
- Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
- Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Classified by ELH/KW  
Date 2/4/74

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDD/ALR

REVIEWED BY ALR DATE 7/25/91  
DECLASSIFY  
DECLASSIFY IN PART  
DECLASSIFY COMPLETELY

SECRET

9/21/76

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# TELEGRAM

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 CHARGE TO

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FROM Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

EO 11652:  
TAGS:  
SUBJECT:

GDS  
PFOR, SHUM, AR, US  
My Call on President Videla

ARGENTINA PROJECT (S200000044)  
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, A/RPS/IPS  
Margaret P. Grafeld, Director  
 Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny

ACTION:

Secstate WASHDC IMMEDIATE

Exemption(s):  
Declassify ( ) In Part  In Full  
( ) Classify as ( ) Extend as ( ) Downgrade to  
Date \_\_\_\_\_ Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_ Reason *file*

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES ~~XXXX~~ 6177

AMB  
DCM  
POL-3  
CDNS  
LEGAT  
DAO  
POL/R  
CHRON

1. I called on President Videla at Casa Rosada this morning at 11:15 and spent almost 1 1/2 hours with him. A report on our discussion of US-Argentine relations--especially with respect to human rights issue--will follow by septel. Points of immediate interest were as follows:

2. President Videla apologized and said he was not yet in a position to give me the name of the new Ambassador to the United States. He did say, however, that it would not be General Miro as several radio and press reports here indicated this morning. He said he hoped to have the name soon and would inform the Embassy as soon as possible (note: Mrs. Musich called my wife this morning before following her husband to Washington. She expressed sorrow upon cutting short their assignment, and said her only regret was that she and her husband had not been able to complete his mission).

DRAFTED BY: POL:WSSMITH:CC <i>WSS</i>	DRAFTING DATE: 9/21/76	TEL. EXT.: 128	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: AMB:RCHill <i>R</i>
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CLEARANCES:

A/DCM:WBeal *WB*

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3. Gwenda Mae Loken Case. I discussed the Loken case with President Videla, pointing out to him the extremely difficult conditions under which she is being held and the fact that she is pregnant. The President responded that Interior Minister has given instructions for the judicial process to be terminated quickly, i.e. for there to be a speedy trial and sentencing. When that is done, he assured me, she will be expelled from the country immediately under order of executive decree.

4. Patricia Erb Case. I also pressed the President for any news concerning Patricia Erb. The President said that GOA has not been able to find any trace of her and has no idea where she is. He promised, however, to stay in contact and to notify me immediately of any new developments in the case. He indicated that when she is found (if she is found) GOA will expel her from the country (and he implied that it would do so before any judicial process might be initiated).

  
HILL

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Classification

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Current Class: [REDACTED]  
Current Handling: [REDACTED]  
Document Number: 1976BUENOS06276

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Page: 1

Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200000044

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[REDACTED]

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43  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W 101650

O 241535Z SEP 76  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7269

ARGENTINA PROJECT (S200000044)  
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, A/RPS/IPS  
Margaret P. Grafeld, Director

() Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny  
Exemption(s): \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify: ( ) In Part (  ) In Full  
( ) Classify as \_\_\_ ( ) Extend as \_\_\_ ( ) Downgrade to \_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_ Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_ Reason \_\_\_\_\_

[REDACTED] BUENOS AIRES 6276

**DECAPIOTED**

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PFOR, SHUM, AR, US  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA

RER: (A) BUENOS AIRES 6177, (B) STATE 227379, (C) STATE 231122

1. AS REPORTED IN REF A, PRESIDENT VIDELA RECEIVED ME AT 11:15 A.M. YESTERDAY, SEPT 21 AND I WAS WITH HIM ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF. I OPENED CONVERSATION BY GOING DIRECTLY INTO HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. I TOLD HIM OF GREAT CONCERN I HAD FOUND IN US. THERE WAS, I SAID, GREAT SYMPATHY FOR HIS GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAD TAKEN OVER UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WHICH ALL UNDERSTOOD TO BE INVOLVED IN STRUGGLE TO THE DEATH WITH LEFT-WING SUBVERSION. HOWEVER, SUCH THINGS AS THE MURDER OF THE PRIESTS AND THE MASS MURDER GET PILAR WERE SERIOUSLY DAMAGING ARGENTINA'S IMAGE IN THE US. US WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE NOT JUST IN ARGENTINA BUT AROUND THE WORLD, AND WE NOW HAVE LEGISLATION UNDER WHICH NO COUNTRY DETERMINED TO BE CONSISTENTLY GUILTY OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAN BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY FORM OF US ASSISTANCE, BE IT ECONOMIC OR MILITARY. I EXPLAINED TO HIM WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF HARKIN AMENDMENT WERE INVOKED AGAINST ARGENTINA (SEE REF B). I TOLD HIM, HOWEVER, THAT FOR THE MOMENT THIS HAD BEEN AVOIDED. US WOULD VOTE FOR ARGENTINE LOAN IN IDB (I EXPLAINED THAT QUESTION OF INTEREST RATES FOR SOME PORTIONS OF LOAN HAD STILL TO BE RESOLVED BUT THAT THIS NOT RELATED TO HARKIN AMENDMENT). I TOLD PRESIDENT FRANKLY, HOWEVER, THAT I SAW THIS VOTE AS PROBABLY LAST TIME US WOULD

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Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200000044

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PAGE 02

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BE ABLE TO AVOID INVOKING AMENDMENT AGAINST ARGENTINA UNLESS RPT UNLESS GOA MOVED QUICKLY TO DEMONSTRATE IT IS TAKING MEASURES TO GET HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN HAND. I POINTED OUT THAT SO FAR AS I KNEW, NOT ONE SINGLE PERSON HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO JUSTICE OR EVEN DISCIPLINED FOR EXCESSES OF WHICH ELEMENTS OF SECURITY FORCES HAVE BEEN GUILTY. I ALSO POINTED OUT TO HIM HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS OF NEW SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION (SEE REFTEL C) AND INDICATED URUGUAY HAD ALREADY LOST THREE MILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY AID BECAUSE OF IT. I PROMISED TO SEND TEXTS OF PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF NEW SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION AND HARKIN AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN MINISTRY.

2. PRESIDENT THANKED ME FOR FRANK EXPOSITION OF PROBLEM AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US AFFIRMATIVE VOTE IN IDB. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN OUTRAGED BY THE MURDERS AT PILAR WHICH, INDEED, HAD BEEN AN AFFRONT TO HIS GOVT.

3. I ASKED, THEN, IF ANY SANCTIONS WERE GOING TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THOSE RESPONSIBLE, THUS SHOWING THAT HIS GOVT DID NOT CONDONE SUCH ACTS. VIDELA AVOIDED REPLY. I SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, BEST WAY TO PROCEED AGAINST TERRORISTS WAS WITHIN LAW. AND WHY, I ASKED, DID NOT GOA USE EXISTING COURT SYSTEM TO BRING MEMBERS OF FORMER GOVT TO TRIAL, INSTEAD OF LEAVING THEM IN PRISON WITHOUT CHARGES.

4. VIDELA DID NOT ANSWER EITHER QUESTION; RATHER, HE LAUNCHED INTO LONG EXPOSITION OF DIFFICULT SITUATION HIS GOVT HAD INHERITED. ECONOMY HAD BEEN ON THE ROCKS AND TERRORISM RAMPANT. FURTHER, HE SAID, ARGENTINA WAS NOW AT WAR WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM, WHICH, THROUGH PENETRATION OF THE SCHOOLS AND EVEN THE CHURCH, HAD BEEN ON VERGE OF TAKEOVER. ALTHOUGH HE HAD EARLIER DEPLORED TO ME MASS MURDER AT PILAR, CERTAIN OF HIS SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS SUGGESTED THAT HE VIEWS KILLINGS OF SOME LEFTISTS AS GOOD OBJECT LESSON.

5. HE SAID GOVT WAS TAKING ACTION TO CONTROL PROBLEM OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENTINA. HE SAID HE THOUGHT PROBLEM HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED, BUT THAT GOA WANTS NONE OF THAT SORT OF THING AND HAS ISSUED DECREE BANNING NAZI-SYMPATHIZING PUBLICATIONS WHICH WERE PRINCIPALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR STIMULATING ANTI-SEMITISM.

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Page: 2

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Document Number: 1976BUENOS06276

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Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200000044

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PAGE 03 BUENOS 06276 241619Z

6. PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD BEEN GRATIFIED WHEN FONMIN GUZZETTI REPORTED TO HIM THAT SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER UNDERSTOOD THEIR PROBLEM AND HAD SAID HE HOPED THEY COULD GET TERRORISM UNDER CONTROL AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. VIDELA SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION SENIOR OFFICERS OF USG UNDERSTOOD SITUATION HIS GOVT FACES BUT JUNIOR BUREAUCRATS DO NOT. I ASSURED HIM THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. WE ALL HOPE ARGENTINA CAN GET TERRORISM UNDER CONTROL QUICKLY--BUT DO SO IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DO MINIMUM DAMAGE TO ITS IMAGE AND TO ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS. IF SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO KILL PEOPLE TO TUNE OF BRASS BAND, I CONCLUDED, THIS WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE. I TOLD HIM SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TOLD ME WHEN I WAS IN US THAT HE WANTED TO AVOID HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM IN ARGENTINA.

7. VIDELA REPLIED THAT HIS GOVT, TOO, WISHED TOAVOID SUCH A PROBLEM. NOTHING, HE SAID, MUST BE ALLOWED TO UPSET GOOD RELATIONS WITH US.

8. I ASKED WHAT HIS GOVT'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF CONGRESSMAN KOCK WISHED TO VISIT ARGENTINA? VIDELA ASSURED ME HIS GOVT WOULD POSE NO OBJECTIONS TO SUCH A VISIT. LET THE CONGRESSMAN COME AND SEE FOR HIMSELF, HE CONCLUDED.

9. VIDELA EXPRESSED MARKED CONCERN OVER FIRE AT NEW CHANCERY SITE (SEE SEPTELS) AND ASKED ME FOR ALL THE DETAILS.

10. PRESIDENT TOLD ME GENERAL MIRO, ARGENTINE MILATT IN WASHINGTON, WHO PRESIDENT SAID WAS CLASSMATE AND CLOSE FRIEND OF HIS, HAD CALLED HIM FROM US TO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER IMPACT MUSICH RESIGNATION MIGHT HAVE. MIRO HAD ASKED IF MUSICH DEPARTURE MEANT THAT ECONOMIC MISSION AROUND MUSICH WOULD ALSO GO AND THERE WOULD BE CHANGE OF POLICY. PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD ASSURED MIRO THAT THIS NOT THE CASE. ECONOMIC TEAM IN WASHINGTON WILL STAY AND THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE OF POLICY.

11. OTHER ITEMS RAISED IN DISCUSSION WERE REPORTED IN REFTEL A SEPT 21.

12. COMMENT: I CAME AWAY FROM MEETING WITH VIDELA SOMEWHAT DISCOURAGED. HE SAYS HE WANTS TO AVOID PROBLEMS WITH US

Current Class: [REDACTED]

Page: 3

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Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200000044

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PAGE 04 BUENOS 06276 241619Z

BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE INTENDS TO MOVE AGAINST THOSE ELEMENTS IN SECURITY FORCES WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OUTRAGES--AND THUS BEGIN TO GET SITUATION IN HAND. INDEED, HE MAY NOT BE IN ANY POSITION TO SO MOVE. I CAME AWAY WITH VERY STRONG IMPRESSION THAT VIDELA IS NOT IN CHARGE, THAT HE IS NOT THE BOSS AND KNOWS HE IS NOT. HE IS PROBABLY NOT GOING TO MOVE AGAINST HARDLINERS. HE IS A DECENT, WELL-INTENTIONED MAN, BUT HIS WHOLE STYLE IS ONE OF DIFFIDENCE AND EXTREME CAUTION. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, MORE ASSERTIVENESS THAN HE CAN PROVIDE MAY BE NEEDED TO GET HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION UNDER CONTROL.

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[REDACTED]  
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Current Class: [REDACTED]

Page: 4

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Bill:

I have authority from above for this. Would appreciate no clearances shown and distribution confined to S, P, M, you and me.



Harry W. Shlaudeman  
Assistant Secretary for  
Inter-American Affairs

Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.  
( ) Classify as (✓) Extend as (S) Downgrade to  
Date 2/1/01 Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_ Reason 25X1

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
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Chile Project (#S199900030)

U.S. Department of State

Release \_\_\_\_\_ Excise X Deny \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify: In Part X In Full \_\_\_\_\_

Exemption(s) B1

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Department of State

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**TELEGRAM**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

*Lawler*

PAGE 01 STATE 246107

**SPECIAL HANDLING**

34  
ORIGIN INRD-08

INFO OCT-01 ISC-00 /009 R

DRAFTED BY ARA:HWSHLAUDEMAN:MMS  
APPROVED BY INR/DDC:WMCAFEF

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O 041421Z OCT 76  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 246107

**[REDACTED]** CHANNEL

*1 Cy P  
1 Cy S  
1 Cy M  
1 Cy ARA*

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PINK, PINS, PINT, CI

SUBJECT: OPERATION CONDOUR

REFERENCE: A) STATE 209192 B) SANTIAGO 8210

WE AGREE THAT OUR PURPOSE CAN BEST BE SERVED THROUGH **[REDACTED]**  
APPROACH TO CONTRERAS AND THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD NOT REPEAT  
NOT BE RAISED WITH PINOCHET. **[REDACTED]** IS RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS  
TO CONSULT WITH YOU ON MANNER AND TIMING OF APPROACH.

KISSINGER

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir  
( ) Classify as (✓) Extend as (S) Downgrade to  
Date 2/1/01 Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_ Reason 25X1

Chile Project (#S199900030)  
U.S. Department of State  
Release \_\_\_\_\_ Excise X Deny \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify: In Part X In Full \_\_\_\_\_  
Exemption(s) B1

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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FBI Docs/LM  
s:Guanes statement  
Dinges collection

Manuel Contreras Sepulveda in coded form which contains a DINA request to receive Alejandro Rivadencira and another unidentified DINA officer and that J-2 acquiesce to the request they would make to J-2 upon their arrival in Asuncion. He said that the DINA message, although undated, probably was received on July 17, 1976. The decrypted DINA message, received at J-2, reads as follows:

"COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATION"

"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS"

"TO: GERMAN (D-2)

"FROM: GUILLERMO (Sub-Director of Foreign Intelligence)

"SERIAL NUMBER V/500

X-S GH171905JUL1076

"FROM: CHILE

"TEXT: TO ADVISE THAT TOMORROW, 18 OR 19 JULY, WILL BE ARRIVING IN THAT COUNTRY FROM BUENOS AIRES ALEJANDRO RIVADENEIRA WITH COMPANION. FLIGHT NUMBER WILL BE FORWARDED FROM CONDOR ONE. I WOULD APPRECIATE ASSISTANCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUEST TO BE MADE BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PERSON."

los pasaportes para invalidar los visados. El 7 de agosto de 1976, el coronel GUANES transmitió un mensaje cifrado al DINA en el que pedía



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Office of General Counsel

26 September 2001

Edward I. Koch  
1290 Avenue of the Americas  
New York, New York 10104

Dear Mr. Koch:

In response to your letter of 9 July 2001 and its attachment, the Agency conducted additional searches for information concerning an alleged threat on your life in the 1976-1977 timeframe. This new search retrieved information about this threat, which I summarize below. We remain unable to retrieve records confirming that you were contacted by then-Director of Central Intelligence George Bush.


The Agency obtained information that during a social event in late July 1976, a Latin American military official, reportedly in a state of intoxication, commented that the military was extremely irritated with your proposed amendment to restrict U.S. military assistance to Latin American countries due to alleged human rights violations by the military. This military official is also reported to have remarked that maybe he "would have to send someone to the U.S. to get Congressman Koch." The Agency's initial analysis of these comments was that they represented nothing more than alcohol-induced bravado.

In the aftermath of the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC, U.S. officials questioned their assumption that other countries would not conduct assassinations in the U.S. Therefore, on 27 September 1976, the CIA Deputy Director for Operations sent a letter to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and the Director of the United States Secret Service advising them of the Latin American military official's comments. The DDO's letter indicated that CIA considered the information highly speculative and fragmentary and, because of its vagueness and the manner in which it was obtained, it had not been disseminated outside CIA at the time of its receipt.

Mr. Edward I. Koch

We are unable to release the underlying material because to do so would disclose the intelligence sources and methods by which CIA obtained the above information. I hope you find this information helpful. Thank you for your inquiry.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.", is written over the typed name. The signature is highly stylized and cursive, with a large, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.  
Chief, Litigation Division

HEWSON RYAN

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

*Ryan was  
at 8/3/76  
ARA/CIA Briefing*

AMBASSADOR HEWSON RYAN

Interviewed by: Richard Nethercut  
Initial interview date: April 27, 1988  
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Now, as far as the other things that I did in the ARA Bureau, I also handled South America, and in this I was very much involved in the human rights problems. The pressures from human rights organizations in the United States on the U.S. Government to intervene in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile, were very strong. Secretary Kissinger was adamant in that we would do this by quiet diplomacy and not public statements or public diplomacy. Therefore, we did a great deal, some of which is slowly coming out into the public domain, in bringing pressure on the governments of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay to some extent, and certainly Chile, by calling in ambassadors, by sending private groups down and sending officials to talk to these governments about their miserable human rights image in the United States. I personally went to Argentine and Uruguay, Brazil, on this. We were able to successfully arrange the release of a good number of intellectuals and scientists during this period. Usually when we would get word from an American group we would immediately go to the post and ask them to go in and talk privately to the people.

But I think that we were remiss in some ways.

I know of one case, which has never come to public attention, of the fact that we knew fairly early on that the governments of the Southern Cone countries were planning, or at least talking about, some assassinations abroad in the summer of 1976. I was Acting Assistant Secretary at the time and I tried to get a cable cleared with the 7th Floor instructing our ambassadors to go in to the Chiefs of State, or the highest possible level in these governments to let them know that we were aware of these conversations and to warn them that this was a violation of the very basic fundamentals of civilized society. Unfortunately that cable never got out and about a month later former Chilean Ambassador Letelier was assassinated on the streets of Washington. Whether there was a direct relationship or not, I don't know. Whether if we had gone in, we might have prevented this, I don't know. But we didn't. We were extremely reticent about taking a strong forward public posture, and even a private posture in certain cases, as was this case in the Chilean assassination.